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I. INTRODUCTION
THE PURPOSE OF this Comment is to discuss venue related
issues regarding negligent air carriers covering both inter-
national and domestic travel. To that extent, issues relating to
subject matterjurisdiction, in personam jurisdiction, notice, ser-
vice, and other related procedural aspects of litigation are dis-
cussed only when difficult or impossible to separate from the
issue of venue.
Part II of this Comment focuses on international travel and
begins with a fairly detailed overview of the international treaty
governing such travel. Part II will also discuss the following: (1)
issues relating to removal of state causes of action to federal
courts, including those actions involving bankrupt creditors; (2)
the effects of forum non conveniens on a plaintiff's choice of
forum selection, including federal, state, and foreign forum non
conveniens provisions; (3) transfer of venue provisions; and (4)
various classes of state venue provisions.
Part III of this Comment focuses on domestic travel within the
United States. Because a majority of the issues discussed in Part
II equally apply to domestic travel, Part III primarily discusses
United States federal venue provisions and state venue provi-
sions regarding foreign corporations.
II. INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL
A. THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The Convention of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air'-the Warsaw Convention-governs ac-
tions against carriers for negligence when travel involves cross-
ing international borders. The Warsaw Convention is a
multilateral treaty, one that involves three or more countries, in
contrast to a bilateral treaty, which imposes mutual obligations
upon two signatories. In the United States, Article VI, Clause 2
of the U.S. Constitution makes treaties part of the "supreme law
of the land."2 Because today's economic and business relations
extend beyond national borders, a fairly detailed overview of the
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 40105 (1994) (adherence of the United
States proclaimed Oct. 29, 1934) (hereinafter Warsaw Convention or
Convention].
2 Abramson v. Japan Airlines, 587 F. Supp. 1099 (D.N.J. 1983).
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Warsaw Convention is necessary before discussing venue in in-
ternational travel litigation.
1. History and Purpose of the Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention had its beginning in an international
conference in 1925 in Paris. The conference appointed a com-
mittee of experts in international air law to prepare draft con-
ventions on international air transportation. These experts
presented their draft as the Paris Conference's protocol at the
Warsaw Conference in Warsaw, Poland in 1929. 4 The Warsaw
Conference adopted the Paris protocol, and it came into effect
in February of 1933 for the first five states that ratified it.5 The
United States was not an original signator and did not ratify the
Warsaw Convention until 1934.6
The purpose of the Warsaw Convention is to provide a body
of uniform air law to the users and providers of international air
transportation 7 and to supplant the member nations' differing
domestic laws.8 The Warsaw Convention introduced uniform
sales rules for ticketing, defined the duties and rights of con-
tracting parties, instituted a two year statute of limitations, and
designated the forums in which causes of action could be
brought.9 The Convention established uniformity in the avia-
tion industry and limited air carriers' potential liability in the
event of accidents.' 0 With this limitation on liability, the airline
industry would be able to attract capital and withstand financial
reverses caused by large scale disasters.11
2. Scope of the Warsaw Convention
By its own terms, the Warsaw Convention applies to "all inter-
national transportation of persons, baggage, or goods per-
S Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 326-27 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
4 Eastern Air Lines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 542 (1991).
5 NicoLAs M. MATTE, TREATISE ON AIR-AERONAUTICAL LAw 382, 378 (1981).
6 78 CONG. REC. 11,582 (1934).
7 See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1083, 1092 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
922 (1977).
8 Domangue v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 722 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1984); Reed, 555
F.2d at 1079.
9 MATTE, supra note 5.
10 Pittman v. Grayson, 869 F. Supp. 1065, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
11 Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allen I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the War-
saw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REv. 497, 499 (1967) (citing the 1965 Annual Report
of the ICAO Council to the ICAO Assembly 13).
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formed by aircraft for hire. It shall apply equally to gratuitous
transportation by aircraft performed by an air transportation en-
terprise."12 The Warsaw Convention only applies to carriers.
Thus, a lawsuit against an aircraft manufacturer is not subject to
the rules of the Convention."8 The Convention also governs ac-
tions against private pilots. But actions against private pilots
may only be relevant when considering short trips to neighbor-
ing territories.
a. Defining International Travel
The Warsaw Convention applies to international transporta-
tion under two different circumstances. First, the Convention
applies when departure and destination are within the territo-
ries of two different signatory nations. 4 Second, the Conven-
tion applies when departure and destination are solely within
the territory of only one party to the Convention but there is an
agreed stopping place outside that party's territory.1 5 It is also
worth noting that under the latter set of circumstances, the
agreed stopping place does not have to be in the territory of a
nation that is a party to the Convention.
b. "Accident" Under the Convention
The definition of "accident" has been debated numerous
times under the Warsaw Convention. This debate arises primar-
ily when courts are required to determine which "accidents"
should be governed by the Convention. The clause of the War-
saw Convention subject to this interpretation states:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suf-
fered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking. 6
In addition to bodily injury, the Convention states:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any checked baggage
12 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
13 In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732, 747 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
14 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2); see also Stratis v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 682 F.2d 406, 411-13 (2d Cir. 1982) (domestic leg of international
transportation by aircraft for hire is considered international travel).
15 Id.
16 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17.
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or any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage so sus-
tained took place during the transportation by air . . . corn-
pris[ing] the period during which the baggage or goods are in
charge of the carrier, whether in an airport or on board an air-
craft, or, in the case of a landing outside an airport, in any place
whatsoever.17
The history of the Convention suggests that the drafters in-
tended the word "accident" to include incidents occurring while
airplanes are in motion or en route and, particularly, to provide
for events such as air disasters.' 8 As mentioned earlier, the pur-
pose of the Convention was to shield carriers in an emerging
industry from large-scale disasters that could lead to economic
devastation. 19 But over the years, numerous individual actions
have been brought which were not the result of a major disaster
at all.
One seemingly unsettled area of the Treaty is determining
what constitutes "embarking" or "disembarking" the aircraft
under article 17. In particular, how far from the aircraft does
one have to be before the Treaty no longer applies.
The "embarkment" language of the Convention does not ex-
tend to all injuries a passenger may sustain from the time he
first enters the airport of departure until the moment he leaves
the airport of arrival.2 0 The scope of any operations of embark-
ing require looking at the total circumstances surrounding the
accident, with particular emphasis on location, activity, and con-
trol.21 Generally, the closer a passenger is to the gateway or
jetway, the more likely the passenger is performing the opera-
tions of embarking.22 Also, the more a passenger is acting at the
direction of an airline in boarding an airplane, the more likely
the passenger is in the course of embarking. 23 Similarly, the
more a passenger's actions relate to the purpose of boarding,
17 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 18(1),(2).
18 Pittman, 869 F. Supp. at 1070.
19 See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
20 Beaudet v. British Airways, 853 F. Supp. 1062, 1067 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (quoting
Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 618 (7th Cir. 1989)).
21 Id. This test represented a combination of the multi-factor test applied by
the Second Circuit in Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
22 Beaudet, 853 F. Supp. at 1067. See, e.g.,Jefferies v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
No. 85 C 9899, 1987 WL 8168 (N.D. I11. Mar. 17, 1987) (plaintiff in the course of
embarking when injured twelve feet from the gate room of departing flight).
23 Beaudet, 853 F. Supp. at 1067-68.
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the more likely the passenger is in the course of embarking. 4
Because a passenger's purpose may entail waiting for a flight, an
overly broad definition of embarkment would allow any passen-
ger waiting for a plane to be considered in the course of em-
barking.25 But as the court in Beaudet stated: "As any air traveler
is well aware, waiting for a plane and starting to get on it are two
different things."2 6
The Supreme Court of Illinois briefly discussed disembarka-
tion in The People ex rel. Compagnie Nationale Air France v.
Giliberto.27 There, hijackers had taken over an aircraft and, after
forcing a non-scheduled stop, injured certain passengers whom
the hijackers had removed from the airplane and confined to a
vacant terminal building. The court stated that the Conven-
tion's applicability depended upon the place of the accident,
rather than where the resulting injuries occurred, and that the
accident consisted of the hijacking itself. 2 The court also stated
that "the removal of the plaintiffs by the hijackers at a point
which was neither their intended destination nor an intended
intermediate stop cannot realistically be looked upon as a 'dis-
embarkation' which would terminate Air France's liability under
Article 17."29
The courts have also addressed emotional distress as a cause
of action considered an injury while on board an aircraft.
Although individual states and other countries may recognize a
cause of action for emotional distress without any significant
physical manifestations, the United States requires physical
manifestations. 30
The Supreme Court's adoption of a foreseeability test in Air
France v. Saks1 further limited the injuries governed by the War-
saw Convention. The Court held that a party may recover dam-
ages only if an unexpected or unusual event that is external to
24 Id. at 1068.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 383 N.E.2d 977, 981-82 (Ill. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979).
28 Id. at 980.
29 Id.
30 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552 ("an air carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17
when an accident has not caused a passenger to suffer death, physical injury, or
physical manifestation of injury"); see a/soJack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F.
Supp 654, 668 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (recovery allowed so long as emotional distress
arose from bodily injury and not about the accident itself).
31 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985) (injury due to normal cabin pressure change did
not qualify as an accident).
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the passenger causes the injury.3 2 The Court's decision was
based on a "significant" distinction of the text of article 17 of the
Convention which referred to an accident that caused the pas-
senger's injury, and not an accident that is the passenger's in-
jury. 3 The Court will not allow recovery where injury results
from a passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal,
and expected operation of the aircraft.' This definition of acci-
dent "should be flexibly applied after assessment of all the cir-
cumstances surrounding a passenger's injuries."3 5
Some additional instances found to fall outside the meaning
of "accident" under the Convention are injuries received while
being retained by authorities,36 death due to natural causes,3 7
and injuries resulting from voluntary consumption of alcohol.38
One incident that has been included within the scope of "ac-
cident" is hijacking. In Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the Sec-
ond Circuit held that the hijacking of an airplane and other acts
of terrorism committed in the course of international flights are
"accidents."3 9 The court based its decision primarily on policy
arguments such as improving "accident cost allocation,"40 foster-
32 Id. at 405. The Court also gave considerable weight to the opinions of other
signatories to the Convention. See id. at 404 (citing Judgment of June 19, 1979
(Air France v. Haddad), Cour d'appel de Paris, 1979 Revue Francaise de Droit
Aerien, at 328 (embracing causes of injuries that are fortuitous or unpredict-
able)); OTro RIESE &JEAN T. LACOUR, PRECIS DE DROIT AERIEN 264 (1951) (not-
ing that Swiss and German law require that the damage be caused by an accident,
and that an accident should be construed as an event that is sudden and in-
dependent of the will of the carrier).
33 Saks, 470 U.S. at 398 (emphasis added).
34 Id. at 406.
35 Id. at 405.
36 Curley v. American Airlines, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(passenger detained and searched by Mexican authorities after captain of his
flight falsely identified him as having smoked marijuana).
3 Walker v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
38 Price v. British Airways, No. 91 Civ. 4947, 1992 WL 170679, at *1, *3
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1992) (passenger voluntarily consumed alcoholic beverages and
subsequently suffered injuries when punched by a fellow passenger); Padilla v.
Olympic Airways, 765 F. Supp. 835, 836, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (passenger injured
as a result of falling in an aircraft lavatory after voluntarily consuming alcoholic
beverages during flight).
39 Day, 528 F.2d at 33.
40 Id. at 34 ("The airlines are in a position to distribute among all passengers
what would otherwise be a crushing burden upon those few unfortunate enough
to become 'accident' victims.").
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ing the goal of "accident prevention, " 4 1 and decreasing adminis-trative costs. 42
B. VENUE UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION
Article 28(1) describes the options available to a plaintiff in a
Warsaw Convention case for determining the forum in which an
action may be brought. The Convention specifies four available
forums: (1) the domicile of the carrier; (2) the carrier's princi-
pal place of business; (3) the carrier's place of business through
which the contract for travel was made; or (4) the place of desti-
nation. "Subject matter treaty jurisdiction" describes the analy-
sis for determining whether the plaintiff brought the cause of
action in the proper forum under the Warsaw Convention. This
analysis under article 28 looks at whether any court of the coun-
try can properly hear the case 4 - and then dictates in which court
the plaintiff may bring the action.44 In comparison, the "subject
matter statutory jurisdiction" analysis asks whether a domestic
jurisdictional statute permits a forum court to hear the case. 45
1. Domicile of the Carrier
One area of United States federal civil procedure that utilizes
the concept of "domicile" is diversity jurisdiction. 46 Where it ap-
plies, the diversity analysis may permit a single corporation to be
considered a citizen in two separate jurisdictions. The first is
the corporation's location of incorporation. The second is
where the corporation has its principal place of business.47
The text and policies of the Warsaw Convention are very simi-
lar in this regard. Courts in the United States have routinely
assumed that the French phrase "du domicile du transporteur"
41 Id. ("The airlines... are in a better posture to persuade, pressure or, if need
be, compensate airport managers to adopt more stringent security measures
against terrorist attacks.").
42 Id. (noting the expense and inconvenience of maintaining a costly suit in a
foreign land against the operator of the airport).
43 Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, 452 F.2d 798, 800 (2d Cir. 1971) (subject
matter treaty jurisdiction required to bring action in a United States court,
"whether state or federal and regardless of location").
-Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(1).
45 Smith, 452 F.2d at 800.
- 28 U.S.C § 1332 (1994).
47 Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) ("nerve center" approach); Toms v. Country Quality Meats, Inc., 610 F.2d
313 (5th Cir. 1980) ("bulk-of-the-activity" test).
170
VENUE ISSUES
in article 28(1) means the carrier's place of incorporation.48 In
Wyler v. Korean Air Lines Co.,49 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals addressed the contention that French domestic law,
which has a much broader notion of domicile (akin to mini-
mum contacts for purposes of personal jurisdiction), should
govern the domiciliary analysis and that U.S. decisions to the
contrary have failed to appreciate the French concept. The
court noted, however, that the French definition of "domicile"
encompassing any place of significant business is only relevant
for questions of personal jurisdiction within France.5 ° The court
noted that even the French courts have recognized this distinc-
tion and refused to construe article 28(1) in that manner.51 The
court in People ex rel. Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Giliberto2
also addressed the contention that a local sales office con-
ducting business on a regular and substantial basis in the United
States should be considered domiciled in the U.S.5" In rejecting
this contention, the court noted that to hold otherwise would
lead to seemingly endless litigation over what constitutes regular
and substantial amounts of business. 4
The most extensive analysis of "domicile" appears in In re Air
Disaster Near Cove Neck.55 The federal district court noted that
the draft history of the Convention indicated an intention to
apply the "domicile" provision primarily to cases in which the
carrier was a private individual rather than a "transport enter-
prise."56 The Czech delegation had proposed reincluding the
domicile of the carrier in an amendment, arguing that individu-
als could not have a principal place of business and therefore
might not be subject to jurisdiction in all of the intended
placesY.5  The draft language submitted by the Czech delegation
stated: "In the case where an air transport enterprise is not in-
volved, the liability action must also be brought before the court
48 See Smith, 452 F.2d at 802; Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804,
809 (2d Cir. 1966).
49 928 F.2d 1167 (1991).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1175.
52 383 N.E.2d 977 (Il1. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979).
53 Id. at 980.
54 Id. at 981.
55 774 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
56 Id. at 730 n.7.
57 Id. (citing from Minutes of the Second International Conference on Private
International Law (Oct. 4-12, 1929) (R. Homer & D. Legrez trans., 1975) [here-
inafter Minutes]).
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of the domicile of the carrier." " The version adopted by the
conference, however, omitted the clause explicitly limiting dom-
icile jurisdiction to cases involving non-corporate air carriers. 59
The court in Cove Neck also addressed the issue of whether a
parent corporation with incorporated subsidiaries in other
countries could be subject to venue under the Convention in
those other countries. The plaintiff asserted that the drafters of
article 28(1) designed it to prevent a carrier from being subject
to suit in remote countries with underdeveloped legal systems.60
In the plaintiffs view, by incorporating in a given country, a car-
rier essentially certifies that the country's legal system offers ade-
quate protections and benefits and thus prevents the
corporation from being subject to suit in some primitive area of
the world. 61 The court noted that this argument failed because
it presumes that the desire to avoid suit in countries with less-
advanced legal systems was the sole organizing principle behind
article 28(1) .62 The weakness of the argument becomes espe-
cially evident when it is noted that the drafters still allowed suit
to be brought in such countries if they were the destination of
the flight or the place where the ticket was sold.63 A unitary
concept of corporate domicile also assures that each potential
forum has a substantial connection with either the contract of
carriage or with the carrier itself.64
2. Principal Place of Business
The principal place of business under a United States federal
diversity determination may fall in one of two places: (1) the
"nerve center" of the corporation; 65 or (2) the place where the
"bulk of the activities" of the corporation is taking place.66
Again, this analysis is very similar to cases within the Warsaw
Convention.
With respect to article 28, a corporation may have only one







64 Id. at 730. See Minutes, supra note 57, at 113; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 11, at 499.
65 Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Toms v. Country Quality Meats, Inc., 610 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1980).
67 Smith, 452 F.2d at 802.
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Dutch Lines,6" the court held that KLM's corporate and opera-
tional headquarters were located in the Netherlands and, there-
fore, Holland was KLM's principal place of business.69
3. Place of Business Where Contract Is Made
At first glance, one may think that a contract for travel is
made from the comfort of one's home by merely picking up the
telephone, calling the local airline to make a reservation, and
providing them with a credit card for payment. This would
place venue practically in one's own backyard for every cause of
action. A careful reading of the Convention, however, makes
this assumption incorrect. The Convention states that "an ac-
tion for damages must be brought... in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties... where he has a place of busi-
ness through which the contract has been made."70 This lan-
guage clearly eliminates the foregoing assumption. But what
happens when one uses a travel agent located just around the
corner to book international travel plans?
A similar issue was discussed in Eck v. United Arab Airlines,
Inc.71 In Eck, a passenger purchased a ticket for international
travel (from Jerusalem to Cairo) in the United States from Scan-
dinavian Airlines System, an authorized agent of United Arab
Airlines. Although United Arab Airlines had two offices in the
United States, one in New York and one in Los Angeles, neither
was involved in any direct way with the sale of the ticket to the
plaintiff. The reservation was first cleared through United Arab
Airlines' home office in Cairo. The fare was then forwarded.
The defendant asserted that venue was not proper in the United
States because the arrangements were directly confirmed by the
Cairo office and, therefore, Cairo was the place of business
through which the contract was made.72 The court held that the
foreign airline had acted as an agent of United Arab Airlines
and the United States was sufficient to be a place where the con-
tract was formed.73 The court seemed to weigh heavily the fact
that foreign carriers typically use other foreign carriers to ar-
68 608 F. Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
69 Id. at 798.
70 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(1).
71 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966).
72 Id. at 812.
73 Id. at 814.
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range travel and provide economic incentives for the other car-
riers to do so. 74
The court in Boyar v. Korean Air Lines7e 5 dealt squarely with the
issue of when a contract for carriage is formed. The question is
easy to answer when a passenger buys a ticket at the point of
departure from the carrier who then provides the service de-
scribed on the ticket. But Boxer involved travel where the first
two legs of the flight were booked and the other segments of the
ticket were left open as to date, carrier, and flight. The passen-
ger had paid the fare for the entire journey at the time the ticket
was issued. Korean Air argued that in no circumstance can
there be a contract between an airline and a passenger before
the passenger ticket is issued, and that the passenger ticket is the
contract under article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. 76 Fur-
thermore, Korean Air's position was that the location where a
ticket is issued controls the jurisdictional question of article
28(1) regardless of whether the passenger takes a different
flight from the one set forth on the ticket, purchases a ticket
that is open as to flight or carrier, or pays for the ticket and gives
all of the necessary information for its issuance in another juris-
diction.77 The plaintiffs argued that the ticket is merely evi-
dence of the contract into which the airline and the passenger
have entered and that the contract itself cannot be formed until
the passenger selects, and the airline books, the particular flight
on which the passenger will actually travel. 7 The court held
that the passenger ticket itself is not the contract to which the
jurisdictional provision of the Warsaw Convention refers. 79 The
"contractual relationship requires only that the carrier consent
to undertake the international transportation of the passenger
from one designated spot to another, and that the passenger in
turn consent to the undertaking." 0 The passenger ticket was
"not the contract but its issuance evidenced the contractual rela-
tionship between [the parties].""1 The court noted that this po-
sition is supported by article 3(2) of the Warsaw Convention,
which states that "[t]he absence, irregularity, or loss of the pas-
74 Id. at 814-15.
75 664 F. Supp. 1481 (D.D.C. 1987).
76 Id. at 1484-85.
77 Id. at 1485.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. (quoting Block, 386 F.2d at 330-31).
81 Id.
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senger ticket shall not affect the existence or the validity of the
contract for transportation." 2
The court in Boyar also addressed the issue of what actions
terminate, as opposed to modify, a contract of carriage. The
court held that whether a passenger's actions constitute a termi-
nation or a modification depends on the conduct of the par-
ties.8" In most situations, where a passenger enters into a
contract for air transportation but decides to take a flight that is
in some way not represented by the passenger ticket issued to
him or her, the passenger and the airline merely modify the
original contract rather than enter into a wholly new contract.84
Under these circumstances, the place of business through which
the contract has been made remains unc'hanged.
8 5
What if someone purchases the ticket for you in another
country? In Campbell v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., 6 the ticket transaction
began when a person, acting for Campbell, used cash to
purchase an Air Jamaica travel reservation in New York. Camp-
bell was in Jamaica. A "Prepaid Ticket Advice Purchaser's Re-
ceipt" was issued in New York and subsequently sent to
Campbell in Jamaica. Air Jamaica then ordered its Philadelphia
office to issue an actual ticket to Campbell. The airline office in
Jamaica notified Campbell when his ticket was ready to be
picked up, and he exchanged the Ticket Advice Purchaser's Re-
ceipt for his flight coupon. The box on the flight coupon enti-
tled "Date and Place of Issue" indicated Jamaica, but the box
entitled "Date and Place of Original Issue" said "20 Jun 85 PHL
JM." Although the trial court held that the carrier did not have
a place of business through which the contract was made in the
United States, the Second Circuit believed that the "20 Jun 85
PHL JM" marking on the flight coupon indicated that Philadel-
phia might be the place of issue.8 7 The case was then remanded
to the trial court for a closer factual inquiry and to allow discov-
ery to determine whether Air Jamaica had a place of business
through which the contract was made in the United States.88
Another interesting question arises when considering the ef-




85 Id. at 1485-86.
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services such as "America On-Line" or "Prodigy." Is payment
made by credit card enough to establish the contract for car-
riage? If so, does the person making the travel arrangements
know from where the ticket will be issued? As an air transporta-
tion enterprise, issuing all tickets from either the business head-
quarters or incorporated office site actually eliminates one of
the plaintiff's four forum selection possibilities.
4. Place of Destination
Of the four venue forums available under the Warsaw Con-
vention, "place of destination" has probably been the most liti-
gated. This fact is due to the complexities that can arise when
dealing with multiple carriers, multiple books of tickets, and dif-
fering interpretations of what is evidence of the ultimate desti-
nation. The Warsaw Convention provides that some
transportation conducted on more than one carrier can be con-
sidered one undivided trip:
Transportation to be performed by several successive air carriers
shall be deemed, for the purpose of this convention, to be one
undivided transportation, if it has been regarded by the parties as
a single operation, whether it has been agreed upon under the
form of a single contract or a series of contracts .... 9
One illustration of this concept is in Petrire v. Spantax, S.A.9"
In that case, the plaintiff made a contract for round-trip travel
but the tickets were issued in two consecutively numbered ticket
booklets. The plaintiff conceded that the "destination" of a
round-trip journey is the same as the starting point, but asserted
that the "destination" must be determined from the terms of the
ticketing contract, and that in this case, the ticket booklet for
travel from Madrid to New York was the pertinent contract.91
The court held that the contract was for a single operation of
undivided transportation as regarded by the parties.92
89 Warsaw Convention,- supra note 1, art. 1(3).
90 756 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 846 (1985).
91 Id. at 265.
92 Id. at 266; see also Vergara v. Aeroflot, 390 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Neb. 1975)
(finding one undivided transportation when around the world journey tickets
were issued in six ticket books of four coupons each). Compare Petrire, 756 F.2d at
263 and Vergara, 390 F. Supp. at 1266 with Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 427 F. Supp. 971, 974-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (first portion of travel
purchased without reference to the second leg of travel did not comprise one
single operation of undivided transportation) and Stratton v. Trans Canada Air
Lines, 7 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,724 (B.C. Feb. 9, 1961) (finding distinct contracts
The Second Circuit in Gayda v. LOT Polish Airways stated that
"for Article 28 purposes it is the 'ultimate' destination listed in
the contract for carriage that controls."93 In the case of a round-
trip ticket, the point of departure is also the ultimate
destination.9 4
The Fifth Circuit was in accord with this line of reasoning in
Swaminathan v. Swiss Air Transport Co. 9 5 In that case, the passen-
ger had purchased a round-trip ticket but left the flight num-
bers and dates for the return trip open. Swaminathan
contended that New York City should be the place of destina-
tion because it was his intention at the time he purchased the
ticket to make New York his final destination and that the only
reason he purchased a round-trip ticket was because it was less
expensive.96 Even though the plaintiff intended not to return to
the original point of departure, the court held that "[w] hen a
contract is unambiguous, the instrument alone is taken to ex-
press the intent of the parties."97 The instrument in this case
was the ticket. The court rejected the proposition adopted in In
re Air Disaster Near Warsaw, Poland as "unworkable."98 The Fifth
Circuit found that the only uncertainty in the ticket was the ex-
act time, date, and flight number of the return trip and that
there was no doubt that the final destination was also the place
of departure. 99
One case in agreement with Gayda and Swaminathan is In re
Air Crash Disaster at Malaga, Spain.100 There, the plaintiff as-
serted that the defendant, Spantax, S.A., had not issued a round-
trip ticket to the deceased passenger, but rather had issued two
separate one-way tickets, one for the flight from Madrid to Mal-
aga to New York, the other for New York to Madrid.' The
crash occurred in New York and the plaintiffs contended that
where different books were purchased at different times to different destinations
than contemplated in the first book).
93 702 F.2d 424, 425 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Aanestad v. Air Canada, Inc., 390 F.
Supp. 1165 (C.D. Cal.), dismissed, 549 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1977); In reAlleged Food
Poisoning Incident, 770 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1985).
9 Butz v. British Airways, 421 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd without opin-
ion, 566 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1977).
95 962 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1992).
96 Id. at 389.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 389.
9 Id.
100 577 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 756 F.2d 263, cert. denied, 474 U.S.
846 (1985).
101 Id. at 1014.
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the "planned destination" was sufficient to provide jurisdiction
in New York.10 2 The court stated that "there is no reason why
the simultaneous issuance of two separate tickets rather than
one round-trip ticket should make a difference.""' The court
weighed heavily the fact that the tickets were consecutively num-
bered, that the tickets were bought at the same time and place,
and that the defendant's explanation as to why two tickets were
issued instead of one was "plausible.""0 a
In In re Korean Air Lines Disaster,1 0 5 a passenger's employer
bought a ticket through a travel agent in Montreal to take ad-
vantage of lower fares that were apparently only available for
tickets purchased in Canada for travel to the Orient.1 0 6 The pas-
senger, however, intended to depart and actually departed from
an intermediate leg of the journey in New York. The plaintiffs
asserted that the court should look beyond the ticket in deter-
mining a passenger's destination to take into account his intent
and expectations.1 0 7 The court did not consider the passenger's
expectations and held that the "destination set forth on the
ticket must control," which was in Canada and not the United
States. °10 The court focused on the fact that there was no plausi-
ble argument that would demonstrate that Korean Air Lines was
aware of the passenger's intentions to depart from New York.109
A more recent case to address this issue is Sopcak v. Northern
Mountain Helicopter Service. 10  The plaintiffs in that case
purchased tickets from two different charter services. The first
leg of the journey was to be by helicopter from Johnny Moun-
tain Mine in British Columbia to Alaska. Once in Alaska, the
passengers, all mine employees, planned to transfer to a waiting
plane owned and operated by Canada West Air to continue on
to Vancouver, British Columbia.
The court in In re Air Crash Disaster at Malaga, Spain,1" how-
ever, held that the Gayda decision did not require that the desti-
nation listed in the carriage contract determine the "place of
102 Id.
103 Id. at 1014-15.
104 Id. at 1015.
105 664 F. Supp. 1478 (D.D.C. 1986), affd sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines,
490 U.S. 122 (1989).
106 Id. at 1479-80.
107 Id. at 1479.
106 Id. at 1480.
109 Id.
110 52 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 1995).
111 577 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
178
VENUE ISSUES
destination" for article 28 purposes in all cases.' 12 In Malaga,
one of the decedents had purchased a ticket that listed a trip
from Madrid to New York and back to Madrid. 113 The plaintiff
argued that, regardless of what the ticket stated, the decedent
had intended only to purchase a one-way ticket from Madrid to
New York and did not know that the ticket she actually received
contained a return segment." 4 The court noted that the plain-
tiff's ultimate destination was New York and not Spain and that
it did not consider the Gayda decision to preclude "either the
passenger or the carrier from showing that certain terms in the
purported contract of carriage arose from a mutual mistake."" 5
A similar case arose in In re Air Crash Disaster Near Warsaw,
Poland."6 The plaintiffs argued there was no mutual consent to
round-trip transportation because even though the decedents
purchased round-trip tickets as required under Polish govern-
ment regulations, the decedents had intended to purchase only
one-way tickets from Warsaw to New York.' 7 The court agreed
with the plaintiffs and held that the decedents considered New
York to be their final destination and did not agree with the
airline's contention that New York was only a "stopping
place."" 8
5. Place of the Accident?
One forum that immediately comes to mind in the case of an
air disaster is the location of the disaster. From an evidentiary
and cost standpoint, this seems an obvious choice. But, as it
turns out, this location was considered and rejected.
As originally proposed to the Conference, the jurisdictional
article provided for jurisdiction at the place of the accident. 9
The Conference eliminated this provision at the behest of the
English delegation, which offered two reasons for the change.1 2 1
First, the place of the accident was unrelated to the expectations
of the parties or to the contractual nature of the carriage rela-




116 707 F. Supp. 650 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
117 Id. at 652.
118 Id.
119 In re Air Disaster Near Cove Neck, 774 F. Supp. 725, 731 n.9 (E.D.N.Y.
1991).
120 See Minutes, supra note 57, at 113-16.
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tionship.'21 Second, the delegation noted that place of accident
jurisdiction might prejudice air carriers by subjecting them to
suit in remote and judicially primitive countries. 122 One might
question whether, after nearly sixty-five years, these rationales
still apply. For instance, what effect on the outcome of litigation
involving an air disaster could be expected from a suit in ajudi-
cially primitive country? What advantage would a plaintiff gain
over a carrier that would outweigh their own cost and inconven-
ience? Surely, inadequate discovery rules would hinder both the
plaintiff and the defendant.
C. REMOVAL: FEDERAL V. STATE CAUSE OF ACTION
Federal courts in the United States have original jurisdiction
over all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or trea-
ties of the United States. 123 Federal courts also have original ju-
risdiction over all civil actions where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $50,000 and there is diversity of
citizenship.1 24 Removal of a cause of action from state court to
federal court is purely statutory.1 25 Although the defendant's
choice is extremely limited, removal gives a defendant the right
to substitute a forum of his choosing for the forum selected by
the plaintiff.126 Because in the initial choice of forum, only
plaintiffs have the opportunity to select federal court, the statute
conferring the right to remove on defendants is designed to al-
low defendants a similar opportunity. This way, both sides have
been offered the opportunity to select federal court in cases
within its original jurisdiction. There was no procedure similar
to removal at English common law, 12 7 nor is it mentioned in the
Constitution. But, removal of cases from state to federal court
has existed ever since the original Judiciary Act of 1789.128
According to United States federal civil procedure:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by
121 Id. at 113.
122 Id. at 114. See also supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
123 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1995).
124 Id. § 1332.
125 14A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 3721 (1985).
126 Id.
127 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994)).
128 Id.
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the defendant... to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending. 129
The only notable exception to this general rule is that:
[A] claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws
of the United States shall be removable without regard to the
citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action
shall be removable only if none of the ... defendants is a citizen
of the State in which such action is brought."' 0
Thus, in an action brought in a state court where the defendant
is a citizen of that state, the defendant will not be able to remove
the case to federal court even though diversity jurisdiction may
be satisfied. The reason for this rule comes from a fear that
state courts would be deferential to their own citizens. It was
designed to protect nonresidents from the local prejudices of
state courts.13 1 Because the defendant would already be in a
supposedly better position than the plaintiff, the defendant
would gain nothing by removing to federal court.
These removal provisions appear straight-forward. The con-
troversy, however, lies in whether a cause of action brought in a
state court for a traditionally state cause of action, such as negli-
gence or wrongful death, affords the defendant the option of
removal to federal court under either federal diversity jurisdic-
tion or "arising under" a treaty or law of the United States
jurisdiction.
One basis for finding federal jurisdiction would be determin-
ing whether the Warsaw Convention creates a cause of action
enabling a plaintiff to sue directly under its terms. A case in
agreement with this view is Benjamins v. British European Air-
ways.132 Benjamins left open the question, however, of whether
state causes of action were still available under the Warsaw Con-
vention. The Second Circuit took on this question in In re Air
Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland.13 3
The Second Circuit in Lockerbie explicitly noted that the issue
it was addressing was not whether the Convention preempts
state laws with which it is in direct conflict, as it obviously must
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
129 28 U.s.c § 1441(a).
130 Id. § 1404(b).
i' Id.
132 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
133 928 F.2d 1267, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 920 (1991).
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tion,3 4 nor was it whether a plaintiff may bring a state cause of
action when the claim does not arise under the Warsaw Conven-
tion.1 35 Rather, the issue was whether state causes of action are
preempted when the state claim alleged falls within the scope of
the Convention. 36 The Second Circuit answered the question
in the affirmative.13 7
In Lockerbie, the Second Circuit relied on the Fifth Circuit de-
cision Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc.'13 and the Ninth Circuit decision In re Mexico City
Aircrash139 to hold that the Convention should be interpreted as
making all causes of action-other than those not based on the
Convention-exclusive under it.' 4 In Boehringer, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the Convention cause of action is "exclusive"1
14
'
and that "[a]n obvious major purpose of the Warsaw Conven-
tion was to secure uniformity of liability for air carriers," and
that uniformity has national as well as international applica-
tion. 142 In Mexico City, the Ninth Circuit stated: "Such causes of
action might, consistently with the Convention, provide varying
measures of damages or varying specifications of persons enti-
tled to recover."' 43 The Lockerbie court also pointed out that
other contracting parties have also concluded that the Conven-
tion cause of action is exclusive. 1" Additionally, the court rec-
ognized that England, Canada, and Australia have all enacted
statutes that make an article 17 action the exclusive remedy for
claims governed by the Convention.'45 The plaintiffs in Lockerbie
asserted that the Convention left certain matters such as the ele-
ments of damage to local or state law.'" But, the court could
"see no reason to believe that the drafters meant to denote the
laws of subdivisions within nations."
47




1- 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984).
139 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983).
140 928 F.2d at 1274.
14 737 F.2d at 458.
142 Id. at 459, quoted in 928 F.2d at 1273-74.
143 708 F.2d at 414 n.25, quoted in 928 F.2d at 1274.






The court in Lockerbie then went on to address the question of
federal preemption. The court focused on one instance when
Congress may preempt state law which is "when the subject mat-
ter demands uniformity vital to national interests such that al-
lowing state regulation 'would create potential frustration of
national purposes.' 148 The court focused on the many differing
applications of state punitive damages laws, the unpredictability,
of choice of law rules, the complexity of applying law to a fed-
eral cause of action created by the Convention, and the possibil-
ity that state-owned airlines would be subject to different laws
than private airlines.14 9 The court concluded that "there is a
general presumption against finding preemption of state law,
but the existence of separate state causes of action conflicts so
strongly with the uniform enforcement of the Treaty that in our
view that presumption is overcome." 150 And "[ s]ince, as a treaty,
the Warsaw Convention is the Supreme Law of the Land, this
federally-created cause of action should be construed exclusively
under federal law."151
In opposition to this view was the decision in Union Iberoameri-
cana v. American Airlines, Inc.152 Union brought suit in state
court asserting various state common law claims such as breach
of contract, willful misconduct, and negligence for cargo dam-
aged en route to Spain. American removed the action to fed-
eral court asserting that the Warsaw Convention provides the
exclusive causes of action available to Union, and therefore,
completely preempted all state law claims.15 3 The court noted
that the Warsaw Convention "is the exclusive remedy against in-
ternational air carriers for lost or destroyed cargo."1 54 But, upon
finding that the case was improvidently removed from state
court, the court held that "the Convention provides an exclusive
148 Id. at 1275 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
244 (1959)).
14 Id. Federal courts no longer have diversity jurisdiction over foreign states
(many of which own airlines) as defendants because the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act is now the sole source of federal jurisdiction in those circumstances.
150 Id. at 1278 (citation omitted).
151 Id. at 1278-79 (citation omitted); see also Cheng v. United Airlines, Inc., No.
93-C-149, 1995 WL 42157, at *2 (N.D. Ill, Jan. 31, 1995) (noting that the Seventh
Circuit has not yet addressed the issue, but it has noted the trend with some
approval).
152 No. 93-2510-CIV., 1994 WL 395329 (S.D. Fla. July 20, 1994).
153 Id. at *1.
154 Id. at *2 (quoting St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Venezuelan Int'l Airways, Inc., 807
F.2d 1543, 1546 (l1th Cir. 1987)).
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remedy by strictly limiting an international air carrier's liability,
but does not preclude an action based on state law as the vehicle
to obtain that limited remedy." 55 The court noted that the uni-
formity sought to be achieved by the Convention was accom-
plished by limiting the amount of damages recoverable under
both federal and state law, not by creating a single federal cause
of action that preempts state law.' 56
In accord with the decision in Union was Clark v. United Parcel
Service, Inc.1 57 There, following the St. Paul decision, the court
held that the cause of action created by the Warsaw Convention
is not the exclusive cause of action.158 The court reasoned that
while the Warsaw Convention had set out certain uniform pro-
cedural rules, the Convention had left many matters to the laws
of the sovereign nations that had signed or adhered to the Con-
vention.5 9 The court went on to state that "[t]he mere fact that
a federal cause of action has been recognized under the Warsaw
Convention does not change the fact that the Convention leaves
matters to local law." 160
Thus, following the decisions in Clark and Union that the War-
saw Convention does not create an exclusive cause of action, the
plaintiff must still be careful not to plead the action into federal
court. Because removal jurisdiction exists only if original juris-
diction would have existed, the "well-pleaded complaint" rule
applies to removal cases as well. Therefore, if a federal question
does not appear on the face of the complaint, the defendant
cannot remove the state law claim from state to federal court
even if the defense is based entirely on federal law.' 6 ' Thus, a
plaintiff "may choose to state his cause of action solely on a state
law theory and bring the action in state court subject to the limi-
tations of the Convention." 16 2 "If the plaintiff elects to sue solely
upon an available state law cause of action, the defendants can-
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 778 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
158 Id. at 1210.
159 Id. at 1211 (citing Alvarez v. Aerovias Nacionales de Columbia, S.A., 756 F.
Supp. 550, 553 (S.D. Fla. 1991)).
160 Id.
161 Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 863 (1985); see also Rhymes v. Arrow Air, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 737, 741 (S.D.
Fla. 1986) ("The mere pleading of a federal statute or treaty as a defense will not
be enough to invoke federal jurisdiction through removal if a federal cause of
action does not appear on the face of the well pleaded complaint.").
162 Clark, 778 F. Supp. at 1211 (quoting Rhymes, 636 F. Supp. at 741).
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not remove merely by asserting a preemption defense that
would limit and condition the state law cause of action." 163
Not only will the possibility of a federal cause of action re-
move a case from state to federal court, but a defendant's bank-
ruptcy may also remove the state action to federal court.
In Murray v. Pan American World Airways,164 wrongful death
and personal injury actions were filed in Florida state court
based on injuries caused by material falling from the plane.
Three months later, Pan Am filed a voluntary petition for reor-
ganization in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the South-
ern District of New York. Pan Am then moved in the district
court for an order transferring the Florida action to the South-
ern District.1 65 The uniqueness of this case is that Pan Am in-
formed the court that, if the court granted its motion, Pan Am
would then either: (1) move in the Southern District to dismiss
the action on the ground of forum non conveniens; or (2) move
for a transfer to the Eastern District of New York, where the Judi-
cial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation had earlier consolidated
other tort cases against Pan Am.1 66 Although the plaintiffs did
not dispute that the language of section 157(b) (5) authorized
the district court to transfer their cases from Florida state court
to the Southern District of New York, the plaintiffs urged the
court to look beyond the transfer and to evaluate it in light of
Pan Am's next move: relocating the case to either the Eastern
District or Scotland.1 67 The court noted, however, that "[w]hile
section 157 limits the courts to which the district court may
transfer cases under that section, the restriction does not dimin-
ish the district court's other powers to change venue" and that
"the district court may simply refuse to transfer the cases from
the Southern District."1 68 Although Murray is not a case that fell
under the Warsaw Convention, there is no statutory bar preclud-
ing a court from ordering this type of transfer involving interna-
tional travel under the Convention.1 69
163 Id. (quoting Alvarez, 756 F. Supp. at 555).
164 16 F.3d 513 (2d Cir. 1994).
165 Pan Am moved for the order pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1995).
Section 157(b) (5) allows a bankrupt debtor to transfer a case to one of two ve-
nues: (1) the district where the bankruptcy is proceeding; or (2) the district
where the claim arose.
166 See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 709 F. Supp. 231 (J.P.M.L.
1989).
167 16 F.3d at 516.
168 Id.
169 See the discussion on forum non conveniens, infra.
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D. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Forum non conveniens is Latin for "inconvenient forum."
The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens arose from
the doctrine of forum non competens developed in Scotland in
the early 19th century as a discretionary device designed to allow
trial courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction when it appeared
that the convenience of the parties and the interests of justice
would be better served if another court heard the action. 170 Fo-
rum non conveniens precluded modern venue provisions con-
taining a more structured means of designating convenient
places for trial.1 71
1. Federal Forum Non Conveniens
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert17 2 and Koster v. Lumbermen's Mutual
Casualty Co.,173 two 1947 cases, the United States Supreme Court
established the framework for forum non conveniens analysis by
setting forth the private and public interest factors to be consid-
ered in the discretionary application of the doctrine. These in-
terests include: (1) the relevant public and private interests; (2)
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3) the availability
of compulsory process for the attendance of unwilling, and the
cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; (4) the possi-
bility of view of premises; (5) the ease, speed, and expense of
trial; and (6) the enforceability of judgment if obtained."7 In
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 175 the Supreme Court expressed the
weight to be accorded a foreign plaintiffs choice of forum by
stating: "A foreign plaintiffs choice of forum, however, deserves
less deference than a local plaintiff's selection of his or her
home forum, because it may not be reasonable to assume that
the foreign plaintiffs choice is convenient."1 76
170 See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 433 (1994) (tracing origin of
doctrine to Scottish estate cases). See also Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Con-
veniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380, 386-87 n.35 (1947).
171 DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIWL PROCEDURE 165 (2d ed.
1992).
172 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
173 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
174 Gulf Oi 330 U.S. at 508-09.
175 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
176 Id. at 255-56. See asoJennings v. Boeing Co., 677 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Pa.
1987), affd, 383 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1988) (action by Irish plaintiffs arising from
helicopter crash in Ireland); Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775
(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981)(wrongful death action
brought by Norwegian residents arising from helicopter crash in Norway).
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Applying forum non conveniens as it pertains to Warsaw Con-
vention claims, the federal courts have retained their discretion-
ary authority.
In In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana,177 mem-
bers of deceased Uruguayan passengers' families brought suit in
federal district court. The plaintiffs relied on the language "at
the option of the plaintiff' in the Warsaw Convention. 17 The
court held, however, that the language in the Warsaw Conven-
tion did not grant the plaintiffs an absolute and inalterable right
to choose the national forum in which their claims would be
litigated.179 The court stated: "'No evidence can be found any-
where that the drafters of the Convention intended to alter the
judicial system of any country.' We simply do not believe that
the United States through adherence to the Convention has
meant to forfeit such a valuable procedural tool as the doctrine
of forum non conveniens. "1 s °
In Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp.'18 1 German personal rep-
resentatives of German citizens who died in an airplane crash in
Germany brought actions in Texas state court against Fairchild
Aircraft Corporation. The action was removed to federal court
after the defendant filed for bankruptcy. The case was dis-
missed on grounds of forum non conveniens. The court, in
holding that nothing in the bankruptcy laws prohibited the dis-
trict court from dismissing the action based upon forum non
conveniens,1 8 2 feared that American courts would become fo-
rums for litigation that has little or no relationship with the
United States, and stated that a court's interest in controlling a
crowded docket also provides a basis for the court's inherent
power to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens1 8 1
A more recent case dealing with forum non conveniens
outside the scope of the Warsaw Convention is Phillips v. China
Airlines, Ltd.1 8 4 In Phillips, a California citizen brought a wrong-
ful death action against China Airlines arising from an airplane
crash. The accident occurred, however, during a domestic
177 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987).
178 Id. at 1161.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 1162 (quoting Charles E. Robins, Jurisdiction Under Article 28 of the
Warsaw Convention, 9 McGILL LJ. 352, 355 (1963)).
181 981 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1993).
182 Id. at 834.
183 Id. at 828.
184 985 F.2d 573, 1993 WL 28362 (9th Cir. 1993) (decision without reported
opinion).
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Taiwanese flight between the cities of Hualien and Taipei. The
federal district court dismissed the claims upon grounds of fo-
rum non conveniens. The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the trial
court's decision, summarized the trial court's discretion over ju-
risdiction by citing from Piper Aircraft and Cheng v. Boeing Co.:185
"[A] forum is not sustained in the United States where a foreign
airliner crashes on its own soil, the airline is governed by the
rules and regulations of that country, and the foreign country
provides an adequate alternative forum for lawsuits."1 86
2. State Forum Non Conveniens
Most states follow the doctrine of forum non conveniens as
outlined in Gulf Oil and Piper Aircraft. As previously mentioned,
however, state forum non conveniens application will depend
largely upon whether an action brought under the Warsaw Con-
vention in state court will be viewed as controlled by state law as
a state cause of action or federal law as a federal cause of action.
Although not all states and federal courts have addressed this
issue, a few state forum non conveniens doctrines are worth
mentioning.
Texas is one state that does not follow the traditional federal
forum non conveniens doctrine under all circumstances. In
Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfara, 87 employees of a fruit company
brought suit against Dow Chemical Company and Shell Oil
Company for personal injuries suffered as a result of a pesticide
manufactured by Dow and Shell. At issue was whether the lan-
guage of section 71.031 of the Texas Practice and Remedies
Code 18 8 permitted the trial court to relinquish jurisdiction
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 189 Dow and Shell
asserted that the legislature did not intend to make section
71.031 a guarantee of an absolute right to enforce a suit in
Texas brought under that provision. 190 Dow and Shell also ar-
gued that since all parties were nonresidents, and the injuries
complained of occurred outside the state of Texas, the courts of
Texas were not bound to entertain jurisdiction. 9 The Texas
Supreme Court held, however, that the legislature had statuto-
185 708 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983).
186 1993 WL 28362 at *1.
187 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990).
188 TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1986).
189 786 S.W.2d at 675.
190 Id. at 676.
191 Id. at 677.
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rily abolished the doctrine in suits brought under section
71.031.192 In response, the Texas legislature amended the
wrongful death statute in 1993 to permit courts to decline juris-
diction in certain circumstances under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. 193 The differences are based on whether the
claimant is a legal resident of the United States. A court may
not dismiss or stay an action if a claimant is a legal resident of
Texas; 194 if personal injury or death occurs by means of air trans-
portation designed, manufactured, sold, maintained, inspected,
or repaired in Texas; or if death or personal injury occurs dur-
ing a trip originating from or destined for a location in Texas.'95
In Crowson v. Sealaska Corp.,19 6 the Alaska Supreme Court ad-
ded to the factors announced in GulfOil: (1) whether the forum
was chosen by the plaintiff to harass the defendant and (2) the
burden on the community of litigating matters not of local con-
cern. 197 Later, in Bromley v. Mitchell,19 the Alaska Supreme
Court addressed the issue of forum non conveniens application
when the plaintiff is a resident and domiciliary of the chosen
forum. The Bromleys argued that the factors of forum non con-
veniens are relevant only if the action is between non-domiciliar-
ies of the forum state and that "if one [party] is a domiciliary,
forum non conveniens does not apply."199 The court recog-
nized that where the plaintiff is a bona fide resident of the fo-
rum state, the doctrine "has only an extremely limited
application."2 0 0 But, the court went on to state that the doctrine
applies regardless of whether the plaintiff is a resident or domi-
ciliary of the forum state.20 1
Florida, on the other hand, is probably the sole exception to
the rule of application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens
regardless of residency. In Houston v. Caldwell,202 a North Caro-
lina resident brought a personal injury action against Florida
residents in a Florida circuit court. The trial court dismissed the
action upon the grounds of forum non conveniens, and the
192 Id. at 679.
193 TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 705 P.2d 905 (Alaska 1985).
197 Id. at 908.
198 902 P.2d 797 (Alaska 1995).
199 Id. at 800.
200 Id. (quoting Crowson, 705 P.2d at 908).
201 Id. at 801.
202 359 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1978).
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Florida appellate court agreed. The Florida Supreme Court
stated:
[T] he recognized law of this state [is] that if a transitory action is
filed in a court of Florida between nonresident parties seeking to
litigate a cause of action accruing in a foreign jurisdiction, the
trial court is accorded a sound discretion in determining
whether it should retain jurisdiction of the action, or dismiss it
without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to reinstitute the
action in a more appropriate and convenient forum.2 0 3
The court found that the application of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens was restricted to the limited category of cases in
which both parties to the action are nonresidents, and the cause
of action sued upon arose in a jurisdiction outside of Florida.20 4
The court further reasoned that dismissal of a suit is a drastic
remedy that should be ordered only under the most compelling
of circumstances.2 0 5 Therefore, in any suit properly filed in
Florida where either party is a resident of Florida, the doctrine
of forum non conveniens is inapplicable.
Louisiana, on the other hand, strongly favors a plaintiffs
choice of forum with respect to forum non conveniens. In Kas-
sapas v. Arkon Shipping Agency, Inc.,206 an action was brought in
federal district court for wrongful death resulting from an acci-
dent which occurred aboard a vessel in Russia. The action was
dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens and was af-
firmed on appeal. But while the proceedings were pending in
federal court, the plaintiffs learned that the vessel was in Louisi-
ana and filed claims in Louisiana state court based on the Jones
Act 20 7 and general maritime law. The Louisiana state district
court dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens. On ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit of the state of
Louisiana agreed with an earlier first circuit decision, Trahan v.
Phoenix Ins. Co.,2 08 that "the common law or federal doctrine of
forum non conveniens does not exist in our laws."2 0 9 The rea-
soning behind this decision was that "were a court to sanction
203 Id. at 859-60 (quoting Adams v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 224 So. 2d 797
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)).
204 Id. at 860.
205 Id.
206 485 So. 2d 565 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986).
207 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994).
208 200 So. 2d 118 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
209 485 So. 2d at 566.
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this device, it would be usurping legislative authority."210 There-
fore, absent statutory authority, courts in Louisiana cannot dis-
miss suits on grounds of forum non conveniens.
The District of Columbia, in Jimmerson v. Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc.,211 stated their prefer-
ence for the plaintiffs choice of forum by stating that "[w] hen
the plaintiff is a resident of this jurisdiction, the defendant who
seeks dismissal faces a heavy task: 'only under convincing cir-
cumstances... should a trial court in this jurisdiction dismiss on
ground of forum non conveniens a suit brought by a resident of
the District of Columbia.' 212 The court went on to state that
the ultimate question in a forum non conveniens analysis is not
whether the District of Columbia is the best forum, but whether
the District of Columbia has so little to do with the case that its
courts should decline to hear it.213
3. Foreign Forum Non Conveniens
a. Desirability of U.S. Forum
In the area of international litigation, foreign claimants in-
jured abroad by products or actions of United States corpora-
tions often seek to have their cases heard in United States courts
because of advantages offered beyond those of foreign fo-
rums. 214 Some of these advantages include: (1) the availability
of broad discovery; (2) easier access to courts and attorneys; (3)
contingency fee arrangements; (4) the existence of civil juries;
(5) the absence of "loser-pay-all" cost shifting rules; and (6)
comparative benefits of the United States judicial system. 215 In
addition, some claims are never pursued in alternative forums
because of severe award limitations.21 6
210 Id.
211 663 A.2d 540 (D.C. 1995).
212 Id. at 542 (quoting Jenkins v. Smith, 535 A.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C. 1987)
(quoting Washington v. May Dep't Stores, 388 A.2d 484, 487 (D.C. 1978)).
213 Id. at 543.
214 Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 252 (characterizing American courts as "extremely
attractive to foreign plaintiffs").
215 Id. at 252 n.18.
216 See Irish Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90 (2d. Cir.
1984) (weighing convenience as a "legal charade").
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b. Foreign Doctrines
Some foreign countries, such as Argentina, do not have a doc-
trine of forum non conveniens 17 Instead, countries such as Ar-
gentina have very strict rules concerning the jurisdiction of the
courts that protect the interests and rights of the defendant.2 18
These restrictions relate to territory, the parties, the claim, and
the matter. 19
Belgium, France, Germany, and Greece are similar to Argen-
tina in that no doctrine of forum non conveniens is recog-
nized.220 Belgian courts have no power to decline jurisdiction
because of strict express rules handed down by their legislature
governing jurisdiction.2 2 1 Similarly, German laws ofjurisdiction
also contain strict, clearly defined, statutory rules that generally
do not give discretion to the judge.222 Greek law is also very
clear that if a court has jurisdiction, then it must make a deci-
sion on the merits.223
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is not part of the Ital-
ian civil system either.22 4 A fundamental concept in that system,
derived from their constitution, is the right to adjudication
before a court and judge predetermined by a general rule of
law.225 This method, at the very least, would seem to ensure sta-
bility and certainty to both courts and litigants.
Finland, although not recognizing the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, employs different concepts to allow courts to take
up a case.226 These concepts allow courts to hear and decide a
case when Finland has jurisdiction over the case and the court
can base its jurisdiction upon a forum norm. 27 What this
means, however, is that Finnish courts have practically no discre-
tion.228 Historically, forum-shopping was never a problem in
Finland, and if a Finnish plaintiff chose to sue a foreign defend-
217 J.J. FAWCETT, DECLINING JURISDICTION IN. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 71
(1995).
218 Id. at 72.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 100, 177, 190, 239.
221 Id. at 118-19.
222 Id. at 190.
223 Id. at 239.
224 Id. at 300.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 169.
227 Id. at 170.
228 Id.
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ant in Finland, he was presumed to have good reasons for doing
SO. 2 2
9
Dutch law of civil procedure has no general rule of forum
non conveniens.2 30 But in international cases, Dutch law has
two sets of specific rules of forum non conveniens, one statutory,
one judge-made.2 3 ' These rules, however, are collateral to the
international jurisdictional rules and unless conventional or stat-
utory rules decide otherwise, the Dutch courts have jurisdiction
if the rules of venue so indicate. 3 2 This becomes especially im-
portant in matters governed by the Warsaw Convention.
In Switzerland, the laws of civil procedure are similar to the
U.S. because there is both a federal system and a system of infer-
ior courts, each regulated by its own code of civil procedure.233
Neither system contains rules for forum non conveniens and the
common law has not developed such a doctrine.2 3 4 But this is
because of the constant effort to appoint an appropriate forum
with enough contacts with the place for every type of case.233
This feature of Swiss law bases jurisdiction not on fortuitous
events, but on some closer connection of the parties to the fo-
rum state. 3 6
Australia, on the other hand, in Oceanic Sun Line Special Ship-
ping Co. v. Fay,37 rejected the concept of forum non conveniens
as developed in the United States and the United Kingdom.23
Instead, in Voth v. Manildra Flour Mills Proprietary. Ltd.,2 9 the
High Court decided that the plaintiff is prima facie entitled to
the jurisdiction it has regularly invoked unless it can be estab-
lished that the forum chosen is "clearly inappropriate." 40 The
defendant must show that the cause of action arose outside the
forum and the burden imposed on the defendant by having to
appear in the forum outweighs any legitimate advantage such as
229 Id. at 170.




234 Id. at 382.
235 Id. at 386.
236 Id. at 398.
237 165 C.L.R. 197 (Austl. 1988).
23M FAWCETr, supra note 217, at 83-84.
239 171 C.L.R. 538 (Austl. 1990).
240 Id., quoted in FAWCETr, supra note 217, at 84-86.
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costs or favorable limitation period that the plaintiff enjoys in
the forum. 41
Japan uses what is called a "special circumstances" considera-
tion to decline jurisdiction.242 When special circumstances are
present that "violate the principles ofjustice," the court will dis-
miss the case.243 In one respect, this language mirrors that of
the U.S. doctrine language "in the interests of justice," to pro-
vide courts with a broad discretionary power to dismiss. The
Japanese doctrine differs, however, in at least one material as-
pect: the existence of other more appropriate forums is not in-
dispensable in dismissing the case. 2 "
New Zealand's doctrine of forum non conveniens is very simi-
lar to that of the United States. A New Zealand court will refuse
to adjudicate on proceedings over which it enjoys jurisdiction if:
(1) there is a foreign competent court; and (2) the New Zealand
court is persuaded that it would best serve the interests of all the
parties and the ends of justice for that foreign forum to try the
proceedings instead. 43 This analysis requires the court to con-
sider two broad fields of inquiry: (1) the factors tending to show
that the forum identified by the defendant has the closest con-
nection with the case, can thus determine the dispute most ex-
peditiously, and is therefore prima facie the appropriate forum;
and (2) considerations militating against justice being done if
the plaintiff is confined to proceeding in that foreign forum. 46
As in the United States, this analysis appears to be a balancing of
interests and allows the court to remain flexible in its approach.
Sweden, although it is uncertain, does not explicitly recognize
the concept of forum non conveniens.24 7 Instead, when a case's
connection with Sweden is very weak, Swedish courts may devi-
ate from the exact wording of their internal forum rules to avoid
jurisdiction.2 48 This way, the courts remain flexible. But, this
type of ad hoc determination may not provide a litigant with any
reasonable certainty that the initial forum will not be dismissed.
Both Canada and Israel use the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens in deciding jurisdictional issues that arise from the inter-
241 Id.
242 FAWCETr, supra note 217, at 308.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 309.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 350.
247 Id. at 373.
248 Id. at 374.
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national elements of a case. In Canada, the doctrine's roots can
be traced back to mid-nineteenth century England. 49 In Israel,
however, the country's supreme court in 1993 surveyed the lat-
est developments in both English and American law as to forum
non conveniens and, in essence, accepted a synthesis of those
developments as also representing Israeli law.250 Both the Cana-
dian and Israeli doctrines focus on whether there is another fo-
rum that clearly has the majority of contacts, or has the most
substantial connection, with the matter in dispute.251
E. TRANSFER OF VENUE
1. Federal Law
In 1948, Congress enacted the federal change of venue stat-
ute252 to permit federal district courts to transfer any civil action
to another federal district court where it might have been
brought. The statute states: "For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer
any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought. 253
Once the action has been properly transferred, the transferee
court must apply the law, including the choice of law rules, of
the transferor court.2 4 In addition, because a transfer under
this provision does not require refiling, a number of issues are
eliminated, such as the statute of limitations, pleadings and dis-
covery material, and application of substantive law.255
One case showing a reluctance to accord a plaintiff's initial
choice of forum much respect in light of a section 1404(b)
transfer is Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp.25 6 In Mills, a products lia-
bility action was brought against Beech Aircraft Corporation in
the Southern District of Mississippi based on diversity. At that
time none of the parties objected to that venue. About three
years later, however, the judge presiding over the case, by letter,
inquired of both parties as to the propriety of venue in the
Southern District and informed them that he was considering
249 Id. at 124.
250 Id. at 262.
251 Id. at 130-31, 262.
252 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994).
253 Id.
254 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964).
255 Christopher Speer, Comment, The Continued Use of Forum Non Conveniens: Is
It Justified?, 58J. AIR L. & Com. 845, 858 (1993).
256 886 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1989).
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transferring venue to the Jackson division. The case was then
transferred pursuant to section 1404. On appeal, although con-
ceding that venue in the Jackson division was proper, the plain-
tiffs maintained that their choice of venue should not have been
disturbed. 57 The Fifth Circuit, noting that the change in venue
moved the case to a different division within the same district
about only 150 miles away, agreed and went on to state: "It is not
as if the case was 'consigned to the wastelands of Siberia.' 25 8
In addition to section 1404(a) transfers, other laws can act to
remove an action from one court to another. In Murray v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc.,259 wrongful death and personal in-
jury actions were filed in a Florida state court. But three months
later, Pan Am filed a voluntary petition for reorganization in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York. Pan Am then moved to transfer the proceedings in
Florida to the Southern District under section 157(b) (5) of the
United States Code.2 60 According to section 157(b) (5), a bank-
rupt debtor who is a defendant in a personal injury action may
move to transfer the case to one of two venues: (1) the district
where the bankruptcy is proceeding; or (2) the district where
the claim arose. 261 The court recognized that Congress enacted
section 157(b) (5) to expand the district court's venue-fixing
powers with an eye to centralizing the adjudication of bank-
ruptcy.262 The court also stated that "[i]f the transfer motion is
met with a cross-motion to abstain, the presumption is that
'transfer should be the rule, abstention the exception.'
2 63
Therefore, although section 157(b) (5) limits the courts to
which the district court may transfer cases, that restriction does




State law venue statutes also contain transfer provisions for
relocating cases within the jurisdictions of the state. In light of
257 Id. at 761.
258 Id. (quotingJarvis Christian College v. Exxon Corp., 845 F.2d 523, 528 (5th
Cir. 1988)).
259 16 F.3d 513 (2d Cir. 1994).
260 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (5) (1994).
261 Id.
262 16 F.3d at 516.




international travel governed by the Warsaw Convention, these
provisions will only become relevant if the case remains in state
court and is not removed to federal court by the defendant.
Once removed, the federal court will apply state substantive law
but federal civil procedures.263
One example of a state transfer of venue provision is that of
Texas:
For the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the inter-
est of justice, a court may transfer an action from a county of
proper venue ... to any other county of proper venue on motion
of a defendant filed and served concurrently with or before the
filing of the answer, where the court finds:
(1) maintenance of the action in the county of suit would
work an injustice to the movant considering the movant's eco-
nomic and personal hardship;
(2) the balance of interests of all the parties predominates in
favor of the action being brought in the other county; and
(3) the transfer of the action would not work an injustice to
any other party.2 6
6
The language of the Texas statute mirrors the federal provi-
sion by including "in the interests of justice" language, which
broadens the scope of discretionary judicial decision-making.
One additional note worth mentioning about the Texas statute
is that section 15.002(c) states that "[a] court's ruling or deci-
sion to grant or deny a transfer... is not grounds for appeal or
mandamus and is not reversible error."267 This statement grants
exclusive control and discretion with the trial court alone.
A more concise example is the transfer provision of New York:
The court, upon motion, may change the place of trial of an ac-
tion where:
(1) the county designated for that purpose is not a proper
county; or
(2) there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be
had in the proper county; or
(3) the convenience of material witnesses and the ends ofjus-
tice will be promoted by the change.268
Once again, the phrase "ends of justice" appears to provide
the trial court with almost unlimited discretion. But, one addi-
265 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
266 TEX. Civ. PRhc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
267 Id. § 15.002(c).
268 N.Y. Crv. PRhc. L. & R. § 510 (McKinney 1976).
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tional phrase in the statute worth pointing out is "upon motion,
may change." 69 The New York courts have found this phrase to
limit the trial court's discretion to transfer. 7 °
III. DOMESTIC TRAVEL
A. FEDERAL LAW
Venue in United States federal courts is largely governed by
section 1391 of the United States Code.271 Primarily, a civil ac-
tion, whether or not it is founded solely on diversity of citizen-
ship, may be brought only in: (1) a judicial district where any
defendant resides, if all the defendants reside in the same state;
or (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events
or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. 72 With respect
to a corporation, section 1391 (c) states that a defendant that is a
corporation is deemed to reside in any judicial district in which
it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is
commenced. 273
The language of section 1391(c), specifically "deemed to re-
side," has led many courts to apply the standard minimum con-
tacts test of International Shoe274 and determine the extent the
corporation is "doing business" in the chosen forum. But, this
test remained very subjective and oftentimes provides the corpo-
ration with little guidance. In Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-
B-Que Restaurant,27 5 further definition was provided: "' [D]oing
business' in a district for the purposes of § 1391 (c) [should be]
read to mean engaging in transactions there to such an extent
and of such a nature that the state in which the district is located
could require the foreign corporation to qualify to 'do business'
there."276
269 Id.
270 See Kelson v. Nedicks Stores, Inc., 478 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984) ("The court is authorized to change venue only upon motion and may not
do so upon its own initiative.").
271 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1994).
272 Id.
273 Id. § 1391(c).
274 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
275 760 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
276 Id. at 316 n.7 (quoting Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc.,
743 F.2d 947, 954 (1st Cir. 1984)).
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B. STATE LAW
State law venue provisions will vary extensively due to the size
and subdivisions contained within each state and the treatment
accorded foreign corporations. But, most provisions mirror the
language of the federal statutes regarding defendant residency
or domicile and locations where a substantial portion of events
took place giving rise to the cause of action. A few states, how-
ever, also allow the plaintiffs residence to be a proper forum for
venue.2 77 In addition, many of the doctrines and procedures for
changing venue, such as forum non convenience and statutory
transfer provisions, previously discussed under international
travel 278 circumstances, are equally applicable to domestic travel.
Therefore, this portion of the Comment differentiates between
state treatment of domestic versus foreign corporations regard-
ing venue provisions.
1. Domestic Corporations
Venue for suits against domestic corporations is usually
placed in the location where the corporation is domiciled or has
an office, or the location where the cause of action accrues.
279
But in Flight Line, Inc. v. Tansley,280 the Supreme Court of Mis-
sissippi seemed to stretch the location where the cause of action
accrued beyond normal definitions to favor the plaintiffs choice
of forum selection.
In Flight Line, the defendant, Flight Line, Incorporated, had
its domicile and principal place of business in Rankin County.
In Chicago, a parked airplane owned and operated by Flight
Line tipped back onto its tail causing improperly stored cargo to
slide onto a passenger giving rise to a personal injury cause of
action. According to Mississippi's venue statute, a civil action
"shall be commenced .. ., if the defendant is a domestic corpo-
ration, in the county in which said corporation is domiciled or
in the county where the cause of action may occur or accrue. "281
Accordingly, venue would appear to be in either Rankin County,
Flight Line's domicile, or Chicago. Tanksley argued, however,
277 IND. CT. T. R. ANN. 75(A) (5) (1995) (either one or more individual plain-
tiffs reside); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:9 (1983 & Supp. 1995) (where some one
of them resides); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-345(a)(3) (1995) (where either the
plaintiff or defendant resides).
278 See supra part II.
279 TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
280 608 So. 2d 1149 (Miss. 1992).
281 Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-11-3 (1972 & Supp. 1995).
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that the cause of action at least partially occurred in Warren
County, where the cargo was loaded onto the airplane and suit
was eventually brought.2 8 2 The trial court reasoned that "where
an accident results as a result of a series of acts, the fact that it
finally culminates in a foreign place does not take it away from
where it began to start."2 13 The Supreme Court of Mississippi, in
affirming the trial court's decision, stated that "venue is about
convenience" and that "there is nothing in the phrase 'where
the cause of action may occur....' that limits the judicial search
for but a single county."2 8 4 The court continued and defined
"occur" in the venue provision to connote each county in which
a substantial component of the claim takes place.28 5
This reasoning begs the question of how remote must the
contributing cause of an accident be from the accident site to be
considered substantial? This question, apparently, will be open
to each state court's interpretation of their venue provisions and
the preferential treatment to be accorded to the plaintiffs
choice of forum.
In contrast to Right Line is Pearson v. Wallace Aviation, Inc.286
In Pearson the plaintiffs were injured when their aircraft mal-
functioned and crashed in Orange County. They asserted that
their injuries were caused by the defendant's failure to repair
and properly inspect the aircraft at its place of business in
Flagler County.28 7 Suit was filed in Orange County, the site of
the accident, but subsequently transferred by the trial court
based on improper venue.28 8 The defendant, Wallace Aviation,
took the position that the cause of action accrued in Flagler
County because the services performed by the defendant, which
allegedly caused the accident, were all performed in Flagler.2 s9
The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal stated that "the rule is
well established that a cause of action accrues where the plaintiff
suffers his or her injuries; normally the site of the accident."2 0
The court went on to state:
282 608 So. 2d at 1155.
283 Id. at 1156.
284 Id. at 1157.
285 Id.
286 400 So. 2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).






To make venue turn on what may have caused the crash and
where that happened, would complicate the general of venue in
personal injury accidents. Had Pearson claimed the cause was
defective design of the plane, would that change venue to the site
of the manufacturer's plant? Or if she claimed she'd been
poorly instructed to fly, would it change venue to where she took
flying lessons? Although other venue rules could be logically de-
vised to determine where a tort cause of action accrues, prece-
dent and simplicity of application persuade us to adhere to the
established rule.291
2. Foreign Corporations
Many state venue provisions, if and when distinguishing for-
eign corporations, place venue by defining where a corporation
resides. One example of this type of provision is that belonging
to Arizona: "Suit may be maintained against a foreign corpora-
tion in the county where an agent of such corporation may be
found."292 This language is extremely broad and possibly could
be interpreted as including almost any location within the state.
Some states, such as Illinois, place venue in a location where
the defendant is doing business: "any county in which [the for-
eign corporation] has its registered office or other office or is
doing business. "293 Although this language also appears broad,
the Illinois Supreme Court has defined "doing business" as "con-
ducting its usual and customary business within the county in
which venue is sought."294
California is probably the best example of a state according
different treatment of foreign corporations. In California, a for-
eign corporation may be sued in any county within the state.2 95
But, a domestic corporation is deemed only to reside in the
county of its principal place of business. 96
This brief look at various state venue provisions illustrates the
need for foreign corporations to choose carefully the manner in
which business is conducted in a particular state and the loca-
tions within a state to open offices.
291 Id. at 52.
292 Aiuz. CONsr. art. 14, § 8.
293 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/2-101, 5/2-102(a) (Smith-Hurd 1992).
N4 Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Mosele, 368 N.E.2d 88, 92 (Ill. 1977).
295 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 395(a) (West 1973 & Supp. 1996) (any county
which the plaintiff may designate in his or her complaint).
296 Id. § 395.5.
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IV. CONCLUSION
What can be readily observed from this Comment is that,
although the plaintiff may have the initial choice of forum selec-
tion in filing for litigation, express statutory provisions and com-
mon law doctrines can quickly work to dislodge that choice.
Statutory provisions will initially limit where a cause of action
can be filed. And in the case of international travel, the type of
injury and location received will dictate Warsaw Convention ap-
plication. In addition, court interpretation of the cause of ac-
tion may lead to a finding of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Once the action is filed, forum non conveniens and various
venue transfer provisions can also act to remove a plaintiffs
cause of action to another court. Therefore, the plaintiff should
be aware that litigation filed down the street today could very
easily be found in a court around the world tomorrow.
